

Lecture 20: Format String Vulnerabilities

Reading:

- Jon Erickson, *Hacking: The Art of Exploitation*, Section 0x350: *Format Strings*
- scut/team teso, “Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities” (can be found at <http://cs.wellesley.edu/~cs342/papers/formatstring/formatstring-1.2.pdf>).

1 Fun with printf

Here we will learn how to use `printf` not only to inspect the stack but also, remarkably, to change it as well.

Recall that `printf` is a function that takes a variable number of arguments. The first should be a format string, which, in addition to plain text, may contain any number n of format specifiers, which are treated as holes in the plain text. The remaining arguments are expected to be n values whose printed representations, as determined by the corresponding specifiers, will fill corresponding holes. Here are some of the format specifiers:

Specifier	Meaning
<code>%d</code> , <code>%i</code>	displays word as a signed integer in decimal
<code>%u</code>	displays word as an unsigned integer in decimal
<code>%x</code>	displays word as an unsigned integer in hexadecimal
<code>%f</code>	displays double word as a floating point number
<code>%c</code>	displays byte as a character
<code>%s</code>	displays string (null-terminated character sequence) pointed at by a character pointer
<code>%n</code>	stores the number of bytes displayed so far in the integer pointed at by an address word

Although `printf` does not “know” how many arguments it takes, it can rely on the same aspects of the procedure calling convention used by all C functions to find their arguments: The i th argument (1-indexed) is at an offset $4 \cdot (i + 1)$ bytes from the base of the `printf` frame. So the first argument (the format string) is 8 bytes from the base of the `printf` frame, the second argument is 12 bytes from the base, and so on. Understanding this is important for abusing `printf`.

We will experiment with `printf` using the program `test-printf.c` in figure 1. This program expects `argv[1]` to be a format string. It passes the format string and various parameters to the `test` function. The `test` function uses the format string both in the “expected” way (with explicit argument values for the specifiers) and in an “unexpected” way (without any explicit argument values, in which case values are taken from the stack).

Here’s a simple example of `test-printf` in action:

```
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] test-printf "a=%i; b=%u; c=%x; d=%s;"  
With values: a=42; b=4294967254; c=bffff2ec; d=xyz;  
Printing: 10, 20, 80485bd, 80485ba  
Without values: a=10; b=20; c=80485bd; d=40;
```

In the first line, `a` is displayed as an integer, the bits of `b = -42` are displayed as an unsigned integer ($4294967254 = 2^{32} - 42$), the address in `c` is displayed in hex, and the string `xyz` in `d` is

```

/* A program that illustrates some printf vulnerabilities.
   Compile this as: gcc -o test-printf test-printf.c */

#include <stdio.h> // Headers that include types of printf and scanf

int test (char* fmt, int a, int b, int* c, char* d) {
    printf("    With values: ");
    printf(fmt, a, b, c, d);
    printf("\n        Printing: %i, %i, %x, %x", 10, 20, "30", "40");
    printf("\nWithout values: ");
    printf(fmt);
    printf("\n");
}

int main (int argc, char** argv) {
    int n = 42;
    test(argv[1], n, -n, &n, "xyz");
}

```

Figure 1: The contents of `test-printf.c`.

displayed as expected. In the second line, the integers 10 and 20 are displayed, followed by the hex addresses of the strings “30” and “40”. In the third line, no explicit values are provided for the four arguments, so these are taken from the stack, and happen to be (with this compiler and invocation, your mileage may vary) the same four values supplied in the second call to `printf`.

In a format specifier, an optional number n can be provided between the `%` and the specifier character (e.g., `i`, `u`, etc.). This indicates the desired width of a field in which the displayed value will be right-justified.¹ For example, `%10i` allocates 10 characters for an integer. If n begins with a 0 digit, then leading spaces will be replaced by 0. We can test this with `test-printf`:

```

[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] test-printf "a=%10i; b=%12u; c=%08x; d=%5s;"
    With values: a=          42; b= 4294967254; c=bffff2ec; d= xyz;
Printing: 10, 20, 80485cb, 80485c8
Without values: a=          10; b=          20; c=080485cb; d=  40;

```

In practice, field widths in format specifiers are used to line up data in columns, but we will use them for more insidious purposes in section 2.

Normally, a format specifier refers to the “next” argument in the argument sequence. But starting a specifier with `%j$` refers to the j th argument (1-indexed) in the argument sequence. This notation can be combined with the field-width notation:

```

[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] test-printf "a=%3$15i; b=%1$12u; c=%2$08x; d=%4$5s;"
    With values: a=   -1073745188; b=          42; c=ffffffd6; d= xyz;
Printing: 10, 20, 80485cb, 80485c8
Without values: a=   134514123; b=          10; c=00000014; d=  40;

```

What would be written as `%3$15i` in C must be written as `%3\$15i` on the Linux command line; in the shell, the `$` is a special character that must be escaped with a backslash.

As illustrated by the following example, specifiers with an explicit argument index do not alter the index used for indexless specifiers:

¹If the displayed value will take more than the specified number n of characters, the entire value will be displayed. So n is a lower bound on the number of characters.

```
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] test-printf "a=%3$i (%i); b=%1\u ($u (%u);
> c=%2$x (%x); d=%4$s (%s);"
  With values: a=-1073745188 (42); b=42 (4294967254); c=ffffffd6 (bffff2dc); d= xyz (xyz);
  Printing: 10, 20, 80485cb, 80485c8
  Without values: a=134514123 (10); b=10 (20); c=14 (80485cb); d= 40 (40);
```

The `%n` specifier is unusual in that it doesn't display anything. Instead, it writes the number of bytes displayed so far by this `printf` into the word pointed at by the corresponding value, which should be a pointer to an integer. For example, suppose that the following is the contents of the program `test-nspec.c`:

```
int main () {
  int x, y, z;
  printf("a=%i; %nb=%5i; %nc=%10i;%n\n", 1, &x, 20, &y, 300, &z);
  printf("x=%i; y=%i; z=%i;\n", x, y, z);
}
```

The first `%n` writes the number of bytes in `"a=1; "` (i.e., 5) into the variable `x` (which is pointed at by the address `&x`). The second `%n` takes the number of bytes in `"b= 20; "` (i.e., 9), adds this to the previous number of bytes (5) and stores the sum (14) in `y`. The third `%n` takes the number of bytes in `"c= 300;"` (i.e., 13), adds this to the previous number of bytes (14) and stores the sum (27) in `z`. We verify this by executing `test-nspec`:

```
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] gcc -o test-nspec test-nspec.c
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] test-nspec
a=1; b= 20; c= 300;
x=5; y=14; z=27;
```

Presumably, the `%n` specifier is for situations in which an unknown number of characters may be printed, but knowing that number is helpful for formatting (e.g., for lining things up in columns).

None of the format specifiers are dangerous if `printf` is used as it is supposed to be used — i.e., when a format string with `n` format specifiers is followed by `n` arguments.

The fun begins when lazy programmers who don't know better write something like `printf(str)` instead of `printf("%s", str)`. These behave the same as long as `str` points to a string that does not contain format specifiers. But suppose `str` is the string `"%i %i %i"`. Then `printf("%s", str)` will display `%i %i %i`, but `printf(str)` will display the top three elements on the stack as integers. If we can control the contents of the string `str`, we can use `printf(str)` to display as much of the stack as we'd like. Even more sneaky, we can use the `%n` specifier to change slots on the stack! We will see both of these exploits in the next section.

2 Stack Hacking Revisited

Figure 2 presents a program `hackme2.c` that is similar to the `hackme` program from Lab 7 in that it squares an element of an array `a`. However, in `hackme2.c`, the index of the element is entered directly by the user using `scanf`.² The string in the `prompt` variable is displayed as a prompt for reading the integer index; this is `"index> "` by default, but can be overwritten at the command line by supplying `argv[1]`. The fact that the prompt is displayed via `printf(prompt)` rather than `printf("%s", prompt)` allows the wily hacker to display and change slots on the stack.

First, let's see how `hackme2` is intended to be used:³

²`scanf` is the "cousin" of `printf` that is used for reading input from the console. For example, `scanf("%i", n_ptr)`; reads an integer from the console and stores it into the integer variable pointed at by the address in `n_ptr`.

³The examples in this section were executed on micro-focus machine `lark`, on which both stack randomization and Exec Shield were turned off (i.e., as root, setting both `/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space` and `/proc/sys/kernel/exec-shield` to 0).

```

/* A program that hints at issues involving software exploits */
/* Compile this as: gcc -o hackme2 hackme2.c */

#include <stdio.h> // Headers that include types of printf and scanf

char* prompt = "index> ";

int sq (int x) {
    return x*x;
}

int getelt (int* a) {
    int n;
    int* n_ptr = &n;
    printf(prompt);
    scanf("%i", n_ptr);
    return a[n];
}

int process (int* a) {
    return sq(getelt(a));
}

int main (int argn, char* argv[]) {
    int a[3] = {5,10,15};
    if (argn >= 2)
        prompt = argv[1];
    printf("***** ANS = %i *****\n", process(a));
}

```

Figure 2: The contents of `hackme2.c`.

```

[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] gcc -o hackme2 hackme2.c
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2
index> 0
***** ANS = 25 *****
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2
index> 1
***** ANS = 100 *****
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2
index> 2
***** ANS = 225 *****
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2
index> 3
***** ANS = 1811399680 *****
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities]

```

Supplying an index outside the bounds of the array results in squaring the value in stack that happens to follow the array.

We can of course supply an innocuous string to replace the default prompt:

```

[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2 "foobar: "
foobar: 1
***** ANS = 100 *****

```

However, it's much more fun to replace the default prompt with something more interesting. For example, we can display the top four elements on the stack as our prompt:

```
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2 "%08x %08x %08x %08x: "
b7fe12d8 00000001 00000000 00000001: 2
***** ANS = 225 *****
```

We can use our old friend Perl to construct a string that displays more of the stack:⁴

```
[cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2 "'perl -e 'print \"%08x %08x %08x %08x\n\"x10 . ">";'"
b7fe12d8 00000001 00000000 00000001
00000000 bffff314 bffff208 00abeff4
00abd1f0 bffff238 0804846b bffff254
0804970c bffff238 08048304 bffff2c0
0804970c bffff268 080484b5 bffff254
0804824b 00abfcc0 00abeff4 080484e0
00000005 0000000a 0000000f 080484e0
00000000 bffff2e8 00969a86 00000002
bffff314 bffff320 b7fe1000 00000000
ffffffff 0094bfc4 0804824b 00000001
>7
***** ANS = 4 *****
```

There are enough quotation marks in this example to drive you bananas. But they're all necessary, particularly the outermost pair of double-quotes. Without this outermost pair, the string printed by Perl (which contains spaces) would be treated as multiple command-line arguments rather than a single command-line argument.

In this above example, we spotted the 00000005 that starts the array `a` and note that the `argc` argument to `main` (00000002) is 7 words later. So entering the index 7 squares 2.

Problem 1 Show how to use `hackme2` to display the square of any positive number n . Demonstrate this for $n = 1000$ in two ways:

1. without using the `%n` specifier;
2. with using the `%n` specifier.

3 Discussion

3.1 Avoiding Square

In the original `hackme` program, we were able to avoid squaring the number by overwriting the return address. Can we do that in `hackme2` as well? The answer is yes, but it is tricky. The problem is that a `%n` exploit requires that the *address* of the return address for `getelt` be on the stack. Let's call this *pra*, for *pointer to the return address*. The address *pra* is not normally on the stack, but we can use the `%n` technique above to write *pra* into `a[0]`. Since we know the offset of `a[0]` from the top of the stack, we can then use `%n` again to overwrite the return address pointed at by *pra*. Finally, we can use `%n` a third time to overwrite `a[0]` again with a desired number n . After this, the `hackme2` program will display n as the answer!

We do not show the details for this example because they are complex. In particular, *pra* is a large number — too large to be constructed using the format-width specification. But there are ways to construct such an address byte-by-byte; for details, see Erickson's *Hacking: The Art of Exploitation*, Section 0x354.

⁴The Perl dot (`.`) operator concatenates two strings.

3.2 Protecting Against This Vulnerability

How do we protect against this vulnerability?

- Program in a more reasonable language than C!
- Always call `printf` with the correct number of parameters.
- When printing a string, use the `%s` specifier.
- Don't allow strings entered by the user to be used as the format string for `printf`. In the CS342 Ubuntu VM, `gcc` will complain if the format string for `printf` is not a string literal. More general, it is possible to do a so-called *taint analysis* on the code to determine if it's possible for a user-specified string to find its way into a `printf` format string.