1 Fun with printf

Here we will learn how to use printf not only to inspect the stack but also, remarkably, to change it as well.

Recall that printf is a function that takes a variable number of arguments. The first should be a format string, which, in addition to plain text, may contain any number \( n \) of format specifiers, which are treated as holes in the plain text. The remaining arguments are expected to be \( n \) values whose printed representations, as determined by the corresponding specifiers, will fill corresponding holes. Here are some of the format specifiers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specifier</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%d, %i</td>
<td>displays word as a signed integer in decimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%u</td>
<td>displays word as an unsigned integer in decimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%x</td>
<td>displays word as an unsigned integer in hexadecimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%f</td>
<td>displays double word as a floating point number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%c</td>
<td>displays byte as a character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%s</td>
<td>displays string (null-terminated character sequence) pointed at by a character pointer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%n</td>
<td>stores the number of bytes displayed so far in the integer pointed at by an address word</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although printf does not “know” how many arguments it takes, it can rely on the same aspects of the procedure calling convention used by all C functions to find their arguments: The \( i \)th argument (1-indexed) is at an offset \( 4 \cdot (i + 1) \) bytes from the base of the printf frame. So the first argument (the format string) is 8 bytes from the base of the printf frame, the second argument is 12 bytes from the base, and so on. Understanding this is important for abusing printf.

We will experiment with printf using the program test-printf.c in figure 1. This program expects argv[1] to be a format string. It passes the format string and various parameters to the test function. The test function uses the format string both in the “expected” way (with explicit argument values for the specifiers) and in an “unexpected” way (without any explicit argument values, in which case values are taken from the stack).

Here’s a simple example of test-printf in action:

```
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./test-printf "a=\%i; b=\%u; c=\%x; d=\%s;"
With values: a=42; b=4294967254; c=bf895e7c; d=xyz;
          Printing: 10, 20, 80485f7, 80485f4
                  Printing: 10, 20, 80485f7, 80485f4
Without values: a=10; b=20; c=80485f7; d=40;
```

In the first line, \( a \) is displayed as an integer, the bits of \( b = -42 \) are displayed as an unsigned integer \((4294967254 = 2^{32} - 42)\), the address in \( c \) is displayed in hex, and the string xyz in \( d \) is displayed as expected. In the second line, the integers 10 and 20 are displayed, followed by the hex addresses of the
/* A program that illustrates some printf vulnerabilities.
   Compile this as: gcc -o test-printf test-printf.c */

#include <stdio.h>  // Headers that include types of printf and scanf

int test (char* fmt, int a, int b, int* c, char* d) {
    printf(" With values: ");
    printf(fmt, a, b, c, d);
    printf("n Printing: %i, %i, %x, %x", 10, 20, "30", "40");
    printf("nWithout values: ");
    printf(fmt);
    printf("n");
}

int main (int argc, char** argv) {
    int n = 42;
    test(argv[1], n, -n, &n, "xyz");
}

Figure 1: The contents of test-printf.c.

strings “30” and “40”. In the third line, no explicit values are provided for the four arguments, so these are taken from the stack, and happen to be (with this compiler and invocation, your mileage may vary) the same four values supplied in the second call to printf.

In a format specifier, an optional number \( n \) can be provided between the \% and the specifier character (e.g., i, u, etc.). This indicates the desired width of a field in which the displayed value will be right-justified.\(^1\) For example, \%10i allocates 10 characters for an integer. If \( n \) begins with a 0 digit, then leading spaces will be replaced by 0. We can test this with test-printf:

wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./test-printf "a=%10i; b=%12u; c=%08x; d=%5s;"
With values: a= 42; b= 4294967254; c=bfad96ec; d= xyz;
Printing: 10, 20, 80485f7, 80485f4
Without values: a= 10; b= 20; c=080485f7; d= 40;

In practice, field widths in format specifiers are used to line up data in columns, but we will use them for more insidious purposes in section 2.

Normally, a format specifier refers to the “next” argument in the argument sequence. But starting a specifier with \%j$ refers to the \( j \)th argument (1-indexed) in the argument sequence. This notation can be combined with the field-width notation:

wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./test-printf "a=%3$15i; b=%1$12u; c=%2$08x; d=%4$5s;"
With values: a= -1079879028; b= 42; c=bfad96ec; d= xyz;
Printing: 10, 20, 80485f7, 80485f4
Without values: a= 134514167; b= 10; c=00000014; d= 40;

What would be written as \%3$15i in C must be written as \%3\$15i on the Linux command line; in the shell, the $ is a special character that must be escaped with a backslash.

As illustrated by the following example, specifiers with an explicit argument index do not alter the index used for indexless specifiers:

wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./test-printf "a=%3\$i (%i); b=%1\$u (%u); c=%2\$0x (%x); d=%4\$s (%s);"
With values: a= -1081744212 (42); b=42 (4294967254); c=bf85e4ac; d=xyz (xyz);
Printing: 10, 20, 80485f7, 80485f4
Without values: a=134514167 (10); b=10 (20); c=14 (80485f7); d=40 (40);

\(^1\) If the displayed value will take more than the specified number \( n \) of characters, the entire value will be displayed. So \( n \) is a lower bound on the number of characters.
The `%n` specifier is unusual in that it doesn’t display anything. Instead, it writes the number of bytes displayed so far by this `printf` into the word pointed at by the corresponding value, which should be a pointer to an integer. For example, suppose that the following is the contents of the program `test-nspec.c`:

```c
int main () {
    int x, y, z;
    printf("a=%i; \%nb=%5i; \%nc=%10i;\n", 1, &x, 20, &y, 300, &z);
    printf("x=%i; y=%i; z=%i;\n", x, y, z);
}
```

The first `%n` writes the number of bytes in "a=1; " (i.e., 5) into the variable `x` (which is pointed at by the address `&x`). The second `%n` takes the number of bytes in "b= 20; " (i.e., 9), adds this to the previous number of bytes (5) and stores the sum (14) in `y`. The third `%n` takes the number of bytes in "c= 300;" (i.e., 13), adds this to the previous number of bytes (14) and stores the sum (27) in `z`. We verify this by executing `test-nspec`:

```bash
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ gcc -o test-nspec test-nspec.c
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./test-nspec
a=1; b= 20; c= 300;
x=5; y=14; z=27;
```

Presumably, the `%n` specifier is for situations in which an unknown number of characters may be printed, but knowing that number is helpful for formatting (e.g., for lining things up in columns).

None of the format specifiers are dangerous if `printf` is used as it is supposed to be used — i.e., when a format string with `n` format specifiers is followed by `n` arguments.

The fun begins when lazy programmers who don’t know better write something like `printf(str)` instead of `printf("%s", str)`. These behave the same as long as `str` points to a string that does not contain format specifiers. But suppose `str` is the string "%i %i %i". Then `printf("%s", str)` will display %i %i %i, but `printf(str)` will display the top three elements on the stack as integers. If we can control the contents of the string `str`, we can use `printf(str)` to display as much of the stack as we’d like. Even more sneakily, we can use the `%n` specifier to change slots on the stack! We will see both of these exploits in the next section.

### 2 Stack Hacking Revisited

Figure 2 presents a program `hackme2.c` that is similar to the `hackme` program from Lecture 16 in that it squares an element of an array `a`. However, in `hackme2.c`, the index of the element is entered directly by the user using `scanf`. The string in the `prompt` variable is displayed as a prompt for reading the integer index; this is "index> " by default, but can be overwritten at the command line by supplying `argv[1]`. The fact that the prompt is displayed via `printf(prompt)` rather than `printf("%s", prompt)` allows the wily hacker to display and change slots on the stack. We will see both of these exploits in the next section.

First, let’s see how `hackme2` is intended to be used:

```bash
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ gcc -o hackme2 hackme2.c
hackme2.c: In function getelt:
  hackme2.c:15:3: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./hackme2
index> 0
***** ANS = 25 *****
wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./hackme2
```

---

2 `scanf` is the “cousin” of `printf` that is used for reading input from the console. For example, `scanf("%i", n.ptr);` reads an integer from the console and stores it into the integer variable pointed at by the address in `n.ptr`. 

/* A program that hints at issues involving software exploits */
/* Compile this as: gcc -o hackme2 hackme2.c */

#include <stdio.h> // Headers that include types of printf and scanf

char* prompt = "index> ";

int sq (int x) {
    return x*x;
}

int getelt (int* a) {
    int n;
    int* n_ptr = &n;
    printf(prompt);
    scanf("%i", n_ptr);
    return a[n];
}

int process (int* a) {
    return sq(getelt(a));
}

int main (int argn, char* argv[]) {
    int a[3] = {5,10,15};
    if (argn >= 2)
        prompt = argv[1];
    printf("***** ANS = %i *****
", process(a));
}

Supplying an index outside the bounds of the array results in squaring the value in stack that happens to follow the array.

We can of course supply an innocuous string to replace the default prompt:

    [cs342@lark format-vulnerabilities] hackme2 "foobar: 
    foobar: 1
    ***** ANS = 100 *****

However, it’s much more fun to replace the default prompt with something more interesting. For example, we can display the top four elements on the stack as our prompt:

    wendy@cs342-ubuntu-1$ ./hackme2 %08x %08x %08x %08x: 
    00000000 00000000 b7650053 0804826b: 2
    ***** ANS = 225 *****

We can use our old friend Perl to construct a string that displays more of the stack.\footnote{The Perl dot (.) operator concatenates two strings.}

Figure 2: The contents of hackme2.c.
There are enough quotation marks in this example to drive you bananas. But they’re all necessary, particularly the outermost pair of double-quotes. Without this outermost pair, the string printed by Perl (which contains spaces) would be treated by the Linux command-line processor as multiple command-line arguments rather than a single command-line argument.

In this above example, we spotted the 00000005 that starts the array \texttt{a} and note that the \texttt{argc} argument to \texttt{main} (00000002) is 7 words later. So entering the index 7 squares 2.

\textbf{Problem 1} Show how to use \texttt{hackme2} to display the square of any positive number \(n\). Demonstrate this for \(n = 1000\) in two ways:

- \textbf{a} without using the \%n specifier;
- \textbf{b} using the \%n specifier.

\section{Discussion}

\subsection{Avoiding Square}

In the original \texttt{hackme} program, we were able to avoid squaring the number by overwriting the return address and the base pointer. Can we do that in \texttt{hackme2} as well? The answer is yes, but it is tricky. The problem is that a \%n exploit requires that the \textit{address} of the return address for \texttt{getelt} and the \textit{address} of the base pointer for the \texttt{getelt} frame be on the stack. Let’s call these two address \texttt{pra} (for \texttt{p}ointer to the \texttt{r}eturn \texttt{a}ddress) and \texttt{pbp} (for \texttt{p}ointer to the \texttt{b}ase \texttt{p}ointer). The addresses \texttt{pra} and \texttt{pbp} are not normally on the stack, but we can use the \%n technique above to write \texttt{pra} into \texttt{a[0]}. Since we know the offset of \texttt{a[0]} from the top of the stack, we can then use \%n again to overwrite the return address pointed at by \texttt{pra}. We can use the same technique to store \texttt{pbp} into \texttt{a[0]} and then overwrite the base pointer for \texttt{getelt}. Finally, we can use \%n a fifth time to overwrite \texttt{a[0]} again with a desired number \(n\). After this, the \texttt{hackme2} program will display \(n\) as the answer!

We do not show the details for this example because they are complex. There are two complicating details:

1. \texttt{pra} and \texttt{pbp} are large numbers — too large to be constructed using the format-width specification. But there are ways to construct such an address byte-by-byte. For details, see Erickson’s \textit{Hacking: The Art of Exploitation}, Section 0x354.

2. Every time we call \texttt{hackme2}, address randomization by the operating system puts the stack frames at different addresses, making a moving target that is very difficult to hit.
3.2 Protecting Against This Vulnerability

How do we protect against this vulnerability?

• Program in a more reasonable language than C!

• Always call printf with the correct number of parameters.

• When printing a string, use the %s specifier.

• Don’t allow strings entered by the user to be used as the format string for printf. In the CS342 Ubuntu VM, gcc will complain if the format string for printf is not a string literal. More general, it is possible to do a so-called taint analysis on the code to determined if it’s possible for a user-specified string to find its way into a printf format string.