- ~p. 24 There's a very deep criticism of humanistic epistemology going on here, which could extend to scientific epistemology as well: We like to think as scientists or humanists that we produce knowledge by writing down our ideas so that we can communicate them. But Said's work here demonstrates the ridiculousness of the idea of studying a subject merely by reading about it, and furthermore, it shows that in our position as inhabitants of a politicized society, and as relatively more or less dogmatic adherents to scholarly traditions of knowledge, our contributions to those traditions are inevitably just that: not knowledge, but rather the extension of a tradition, which is in fact also simultaneously a hegemonic cultural force and thus a mechanism of power/domination. This relates to the philosophical idea of intentionality.
- An example: how should I teach someone about California? Instead of writing a book or even website about it, it's better that I take them there and travel with them so they can experience it themselves. In fact, no amount of reading, looking at pictures, watching videos, or even playing VR games can substitute for the actual experience of being there, and particularly meeting those who live there (note: and who exactly are we talking about?). Thus any kind of humanistic study of California can never authentically serve the purpose of educating people about California, or producing true knowledge of California. In fact, even as someone who grew up in (part of) California and has lived there the majority of my adult life, I have only a shallow knowledge of it.
- But is this problem confined to humanistic inquiry? It may not be quite the same in the sciences, but neither it is totally absent. Some true knowledge of technical subjects can also be acquired mainly by experience, and therefore again writing and publishing is an empty gesture, to a degree. Knoweldge ends up being shared not by words, but by reenactment and rediscovery (which admittedly could be guided by words). Of course this highlights the importance of educational institutions where experience can be propagated, but those have very limited reach.
- Caveat: Even going to a place and meeting the people there may not produce knowledge of them if one arrives with preconceived notions and does not respect those people.
~p. 147 There's something that Said has not mentioned yet, which is any notion of whether scholars in the Orient were constructing their own histories, and whether those might be more authentic. Given the ridiculousness of the European histories of the Orient being constructed in Europe, it might be interesting to contrast them against e.g., Arabic histories of the Arabian peninsula or of Islam.
- ~ p. 150 Looking at the roots of modern science (e.g. linguistics) reveals much we might disagree with. But those positions can be filtered through sequential citations directly into our own work.
- p. 151 more examples of this in history.
p. 150 Inequality invites study which enshrines inequality. This is often evident today in the study of modern racism, where scientists looking to "prove" racism don't overtly essentialize the distinctions the find, but neither do they always grapple with the mechanisms of white supremacy which perpetuate those differences.
~ p. 153 How is Minecraft potentially useful for imperialism/colonialism today?
~ p. 154 The dangers of treating humans either as homogeneous cultural units or as mythologized exemplars.
~ p. 160 Who is the beneficiary of the "knowledge" that is produced by academia? Who does or does not merit access to it?